THE EXCLUSION OF IMMIGRANTS FROM WELFARE PROGRAMS

Cross-National Analysis and Contemporary Developments

Edited by Edward A. Koning
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Progress Party; see chapter 8). For example, former President Trump modeled some of his rhetoric after these political parties, using a similar call to develop a "worker's party" rooted in opposition to immigrant labor. This may well yield continued legislative stalemate, with status favoring restricted social welfare provision for immigrants. There may not be new 1996-style shifts that impose additional burdens on immigrant populations or exclude them more than at present; however, there will also likely not be dramatic shifts toward immigrant inclusion in US social welfare programs. In our view, the most likely scenario is policy stalemate and continued immigrant exclusion from US social welfare programs. Occasionally, individual states like California may undertake expansive welfare reforms for non-citizens, such as extending Medicaid benefits to undocumented immigrants, but the broad national posture still tilts toward exclusion. Given the current American fault lines of demographics, culture, and institutions, it would seemingly take something much more revolutionary to produce a welfare state with greater inclusion of immigrant populations. We remain sceptical that this will happen in the short or medium term; longer-term prospects for fundamental change in the US are somewhat rosier. The centre of gravity in the US continues to pull in the direction of immigrant welfare exclusion.

NOTES

1 This measure has advantages and disadvantages. When possible, we picked non-citizens since citizenship is one of the barriers preventing many immigrants from accessing SNAP. An additional difficulty in measuring SNAP participation is that benefits can be awarded to the citizen-children of non-citizen immigrants.

2 "Dreamers" refers to unauthorized immigrants who were brought to the US as children.

3 "Gang of Eight" refers to a bipartisan group of eight U.S. senators — four Republicans and four Democrats — who drafted the Immigration Modernization Act of 2013.

10 Why Choose the Inclusionary Path? Social Policy in a Recent Welfare and Immigration Country: The Case of Portugal

Catarina Reis Oliveira and João Peixoto

Academics and policy-makers have long discussed the potential tension between immigration and welfare, arguing about the consequences of social policy differentiation between immigrants and the native-born in host societies. However, welfare politics and responses to immigrants' social benefit dependence are not straightforward: whether they become less or more inclusive toward immigrants depends on the host country's welfare conditions, socio-economic and political characteristics, and experience with immigrants. As we will highlight in this chapter, and against what could be expected (and as Koning 2019 also concluded), the politics of immigrant welfare exclusion or inclusion are not straightforward and have to do with other factors besides economic ones.

While its experience with immigration has been only recent (positive net migration dates back only to 1993), and while its immigrant population today is relatively small (in 2020, only 6.4% of residents), several international comparative reports and studies over the past decade have named Portugal as having one of the best integration policies in the world and as one of the most inclusionary countries for immigrants (see, e.g., MIPEX scores for 2007, 2010, and 2015; IOM 2010; UNDP 2009). So it is no surprise that Portugal is the second most inclusive country in the Immigrant Exclusion from Social Programs Index (IESPI).

The IESPI dataset indicates that Portugal is the country that has undergone the most spectacular transformation. After ranking as the second-most exclusionary country in 1990 (after Malta), it became the second most inclusionary in 2010 and 2015 (after Norway; see Figure 10.1). The general evolution of the Portuguese welfare system and various contextual factors help explain not only why Portugal is presently inclusionary but also why it has become so much more inclusionary over the past three decades. Those factors include the end of the dictatorial regime in 1974; the end of colonialism in the 1970s and increased inflows from former colonies; the country's entry into the EU in 1986; positive net migration after 1993; a negative natural balance since 2007;
economic and financial crises; relatively favourable public opinion about immigration; and a lack of divisive political actors.

This change did not happen without difficulties. For one thing, the welfare regime is very recent. Portugal was part of the third wave of democratization worldwide (after the military coup on 25 April 1974 and a long history of colonization). Both the national health system (created only in 1979) and the welfare system (the first basic law dates back to 1984) were direct consequences of an aspiring democratic country that wished for more economic and social equality after a long authoritarian regime.

At the same time, though, the country has endured successive and prolonged economic crises, such as the one that started after the world economic crisis in 2008, which led to a financial bailout and an outside intervention that directly affected the welfare system’s ability to take care of all residents (both native-born and foreigners). Moreover, Portugal faces an aging population that will make its welfare system harder to sustain. Despite this, Portugal has embraced humanitarian social policies and has avoided differentiating between immigrants and the native-born, as defined in the 1976 Constitution, which marked the advent of democracy in the country.

Portugal’s migratory experience has its own particularities that explain its inclusionary welfare path. Most of the inflows have a postcolonial character, with the result that the cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity that immigration has brought about is limited. Immigration to the country has been driven mainly by economics, with immigrants showing high labour participation rates and lower social benefit dependency.

Nonetheless, equality and inclusion are not synonymous with welfare state generosity and high social expenditure. This chapter analyses the determinants for the increased social policy homogenization between immigrants and native-born in Portugal in recent decades. In documenting that the Portuguese welfare system has become inclusionary toward immigrants, we are not suggesting there has been an increase in welfare state spending, as clearly Portugal is not among the most generous welfare states in Europe.¹

Taken together, these contextual factors and legacies explain the politics of welfare for immigrants. The chapter begins by characterizing the Portuguese welfare regime, taking into account the chronology of social policies since the end of the 1970s and underscoring the factors that led to the present inclusionary setting. After that, we revisit Portugal’s immigration history; then we briefly describe the immigrant population and the evolution of integration policies targeting them. We then identify the main immigrant social inclusion outcomes, considering achievements and challenges. To explain the factors that led to Portugal’s integration policies and the extension of social rights to foreign residents, a further section highlights the favourable political climate, which is characterized by relatively pro-immigration attitudes among both politicians and the Portuguese public. Finally, some concluding remarks will be made.

Creating the Inclusionary Portuguese Welfare State

In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) placed Portugal among the generally “conservative” group of Continental European countries, which emphasize family as a means of social support, but also classified it as a Southern European type of welfare regime, acknowledging the impact of a relatively late democracy and the role of the informal economy. Although countries have deviated from Esping-Andersen’s original classification over the past thirty years, especially since the policy changes of the last decade arising from the 2008 economic crisis (Eurofound 2015; 8), several regime characteristics are still apparent.

Portugal’s colonial and authoritarian legacies played a role in the country designing an inclusionary welfare state, especially after 1974, when the country joined the “third wave of democratization” and developed several social policies (Esping-Andersen 1993). Portugal’s accession to the EU in 1986 also encouraged the quick build-up and consolidation of a modern welfare regime.

In relation to social policy differentiation toward immigrants, Portugal has undergone much change (Figure 10.1). First, it is important to understand that
because Portugal is a relatively recent country of immigration, most social policy differentiation between native-born and immigrants until the 1990s was not necessarily evidence of an exclusionary policy orientation; mainly, it was a consequence of immigration being absent from policy-makers' attention (e.g., the first Immigration Act dates back only to 1981 and was tabled in the context of the country's entry into the EU, and the first steps in developing immigrant integration policies were taken only in 1996). Indeed, at no point has Portugal introduced exclusionary frameworks deliberately aimed at differentiating between immigrants and native-born.

A description of the main elements in the making of the Portuguese welfare system, along with changes in several contextual factors, explain not only why Portugal is exclusionary now but also why it has become so much more exclusionary over the past three decades.\(^2\)

The existence of the national health system, public education system, and social protection in Portugal is a direct consequence of the revolution of 25 April 1974 that ended the authoritarian regime and induced several revolutionary social dynamics, the end goal being more economic, political, and social equality. All of this led to the 1976 Constitution, which underscored the general principle of equality and ample social rights as part and parcel of the advent of democracy in the country (González and Figueiredo 2014, 291).

Over the past four decades, the country has launched successive basic laws in social security, health, and education. Those legal frameworks, while reflecting different governments' interpretations of the country's constitutional ambitions, its socio-economic situation, and its capacity to finance public expenditure, have together strengthened the principle of universality of social rights enshrined in the Constitution. Since then, national citizenship has not been a precondition for accessing fundamental rights in Portugal. Foreigners and stateless persons residing in the country enjoy the same rights as the native-born and are subject to the same duties (Oliveira and Carvalhais 2017, 793). Moreover, the conditions that immigrants encounter in Portugal are uniform across the country (much like what we saw in Norway in chapter 8, and in contrast to what we saw in Austria and the United States in chapters 7 and 9 of this volume).

Under the new democratic government established in 1974, Portugal began transitioning to a unified model of social security that expanded social protection. It did so through a series of concrete measures related to social pensions, unemployment protection, family subsidies, and social protection for self-employed and domestic workers. In 1977, the country enacted the first legal framework for social security based on three fundamental principles—integration, decentralization, and participation. Seven years later, in 1984, followed the first Social Security Act.

It was also under constitutional principles that in 1979 Portugal created the National Health System, which made explicit that access should be guaranteed "to all citizens, no matter their economic and social conditions," and that "the access is guaranteed to foreigners in reciprocity, to stateless and to refugees residing in the country" (Oliveira and Gomes 2018, 107–8).

The 1976 Constitution identified housing as a fundamental social right. However, housing has always had a peripheral place in Portuguese public policy, receiving far fewer public resources than education, health, and social security. Portugal has reduced its public intervention in housing, as have other Southern European countries. Hence, housing has been dominated by the private sector, and there are very few available public housing units. In 1993, Portugal launched a special program of social housing in several municipalities. Since then, many social housing programs and rent assistance policies have been promoted throughout the country, for which foreign residents have been eligible on the same terms as Portuguese nationals. Over the past two decades, specific measures aimed at more vulnerable groups, such as the homeless, the elderly, and immigrants, have been defined in Housing Action Plans (Malheiro and Fonseca 2010, 81–3), and action plans for immigrants' integration today are part of several measures on housing tailored to immigrants. Nonetheless, given that immigrants find it harder to access credit for private housing, the available social supports and housing programs are often seen as not enough for their needs.

The 1990s were characterized by increased financial strains and numerous initiatives to reform social protection. These led to the introduction of contributory fees and penalties for infractions against the national social security system. Since 1995, general social assistance benefits have been available to foreigners residing legally in Portugal. Foreign residents' access to social welfare entitlements was reinforced in the 1990s to encourage formal labour market integration and to discourage work in the informal economy as well as irregular stay in the country. In 1996, on the recommendation of the European Commission, the Portuguese government launched the "minimum income subsistence." This benefit was made accessible for foreign residents after one year of residence. After 1998, access to unemployment insurance and to labour market programs was extended to foreigners who had worked and paid social security for a minimum period of time in the country (presently a minimum of six months is required).

The new century saw a rapid transformation of the immigrant population in Portugal: between 1999 and 2002, the foreign population residing in the country more than doubled, from 190,000 to 413,000. Moreover, that population became much more diverse, in particular because more immigrants arrived from non-Portuguese speaking countries and from countries with which Portugal had no historical links. All of this pressured the country to invest in integration policies and to pay closer heed to immigrants' social protection. Hence most inclusionary welfare policies date back to the beginning of this century.
Until 2001, health services were available solely to nationals and foreigners from countries with which Portugal had reciprocal health agreements. That year, the national health system was opened to all foreign residents, including undocumented immigrants residing in the country for more than 90 days. Nonetheless, depending on immigrants’ legal status, the treatments have to be paid entirely or partly with established fees, with exemptions for minors under 12, pregnant women, and those for whom the denial of treatment would risk public health (for an overview see Oliveira and Gomes 2018, 95–117).

A legislative reform in 2003 disenfranchised a large number of immigrants residing in Portugal from minimum income subsistence. These changes were not entirely implemented, however, in part because they were rejected by the Constitutional Court and in part because the left-wing government that took office in 2005 revoked those changes, including the restrictions to immigrants’ access.

In 2007, under the same centre-left government, a new Social Security Act adjusted the system to align it with the country’s aging population; this meant that the old-age pension system now reflected the life expectancy of the population. Also in 2007, the new Immigration Act (still in force) underscored that foreigners with legal residence in Portugal have social rights; it also made enrolment in the social security system a precondition for obtaining or renewing residence in the country.

The 2007 Social Security Act was revised again in 2013 in the context of a financial and economic crisis and a population decrease. In addition to demographic pressures, the Portuguese welfare system has been especially impacted over the past decade by economic and financial crises, mainly between 2011 and 2014, when the ‘Troika’ intervened in the country. This period was marked by fewer contributors and growing numbers of beneficiaries of social protection. In 2012, several changes were introduced in the social protection regime, with the main argument that the most vulnerable could not be allowed to undermine the financial sustainability of the social security system (stated in the decree law; see Oliveira and Gomes 2019, 212). As a consequence, economic support for very low income families decreased, which increased the number of families at risk of poverty and material deprivation, including immigrant families (Eurofound 2015, 60; Oliveira and Gomes 2019, 203, 212).

Also as a result of the 2011–14 crisis, Portugal made several reactive political decisions regarding the management of its national health system. These have focused on reducing costs, limiting access to services, and increasing user fees for public health services. These measures were especially problematic in a context in which the population at risk of poverty had grown, and they led to an increase in health inequality (Sakellairides et al. 2014, 31; Padilla et al. 2018, 319; Oliveira and Gomes 2018, 113–17). These changes triggered many complaints to the National Ombudsman, and in 2014 they were partly reversed though an expansion of exceptions to users’ charges for health services (Oliveira and Gomes 2018, 128–36).

Between 2012 and 2015, a centre-right government implemented explicit social policy differentiation according to the nationality of residents: nationals and EU citizens residing in Portugal could benefit from minimum income subsistence after one year of residence, but non-EU citizens would have to wait three years. These differentiations were overturned by the Constitutional Court in 2015 (judgment 296/2015) based on the argument that social rights are universally protected in Portugal and that all foreign residents have the same rights and duties as nationals. Hence, at the end of 2015, under a centre-left government, the welfare system returned to its previous framework and social security allowances were revised and increased.

During the 2011–14 crisis the sustainability of the welfare and health systems was debated, both in relative economic terms (costs as a percentage of GDP) and in absolute financial terms (public expenses). So far, however, the constitutional principles of equality and universality have prevailed against attempts to differentiate between immigrants and the native-born.

Foreign residents in Portugal, once legalized, have the same rights and duties as national citizens when they come to social security. However, they still need to satisfy certain eligibility requirements, such as minimum residence and contributions. They also need to be registered in the national social security system in order to obtain or renew their residence permits. In 2019 the Portuguese parliament approved a law that mandated that one year of payments to the welfare system gave a foreigner the right to obtain a residence permit, even if he/she had not entered the country legally. Centre-right parties voted against this law, arguing that it would open the door to all sorts of immigrants. However, the centre-left majority in parliament insisted that this new law would “dignify” labour immigrants, who at the time were paying for national welfare without being able to legalize their residence in the country or gain social protection as residents.

In short, the Portuguese welfare system is a new and at times troublesome one. It has set out to grant public support to all citizens and residents in an era marked by global and national economic challenges. The national public debt and financial tensions, in particular those arising from the global economic crisis and the subsequent intervention by the Troika, have together limited Portugal’s ability to guarantee welfare for all residents and resulted in a revision of certain welfare characteristics. The Portuguese welfare system is relatively inclusionary (as the IESPI demonstrates), and by constitutional principle it is universal to all residents (including foreign residents), but these characteristics do not mean it is able to address all needs effectively and consistently.

Explicit restrictions on immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits have been consistently condemned in Portugal. Instead, constraints have been imposed on the overall population in times of crisis. As such, although the
social policy differentiation between immigrants and the native-born has not increased, the overall population at risk of poverty and welfare dependence has grown larger. Thus, during the crisis, welfare state protections in Portugal decreased generally in scope and efficacy, meaning that the inclusionary outcomes in the IESPI dataset in the crisis years of 2010 and 2015 may not necessarily reflect that the welfare state gave immigrants more (in terms of an increase of generosity), but instead that it gave the native-born less.

**Portugal’s Migratory Experience and Immigrants’ Characteristics**

Researchers today are trying harder to determine how welfare state politics and policies of social redistribution are influenced by the levels and patterns of immigration flows and stocks (for a synthesis, see Burgoon and Rooduijn 2020). Many have debated whether welfare states can cope with increasing numbers of immigrants (including refugees), expressing concerns that they may weaken support for welfare redistribution and increase exclusion and social policy differentiation between immigrants and the native-born.

Here, as a contribution to this debate, we consider Portugal’s experience with migration as a determinant of the politics of welfare. An immediate apparent contradiction arises from this analysis: according to the IESPI dataset, Portugal moved from one of the most exclusionary countries (in 1990) to one of the most inclusionary (in 2010 and 2015), precisely at a time when it was increasing its immigration flows and stock. That is, Portugal moved in an inclusionary direction even while increasing immigration.

The increase in the foreign population has been very sharp since the 1980s (see Figure 10.2) – from around 100,000 individuals in the early 1990s, representing around 1% of the population, to 589,000 in 2019, representing 5.7% of the population. Although to a lesser degree than other European host countries, Portugal has become an immigration country.

However, the effects of the migratory experience on social policy differentiation may not be fully captured by aggregate data on stocks and flows. Portugal is an experienced emigration country and has only recently attracted large-scale immigration – for every non-citizen resident in Portugal, there are 5 non-resident Portuguese citizens abroad (Pires 2010). Emigration and immigration have coexisted in recent decades. Like other Southern European countries, Portugal underwent a migration turn in the 1990s during which immigration increased and became structural. Even so, emigration never ceased: after the massive flows of the 1960s and early 1970s, it resumed in the mid-1980s – mainly, after 2011, during the economic and financial crisis (Peixoto et al. 2016). Emigration and immigration have also been intertwined, in that many flows occur along the same geographical corridor – for example, uniting Portugal and Brazil in opposite directions.

This migratory experience has left its mark on the country’s attitudes and policies regarding immigration. Policy-makers on issues of immigrant integration often turn to the argument that the rights claimed for Portuguese emigrants living abroad are the same as those advocated for immigrants residing in Portugal (Oliveira 2012, 294). In this way, the emigration experience has fostered a pro-migrant narrative, including in the provision of social rights.

From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, inflows spiked because of the abrupt return from the ex-colonies after the democratization and decolonization in 1974, as well as the return of emigrants from Europe. Except for this, however, positive net migration only became a reality in 1993. After a new period of net emigration between 2011 and 2016 as a consequence of the economic crisis, net immigration increased again, before coming to an abrupt halt in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Foreign inflows to Portugal date back to the 1960s, when immigrants from Cape Verde, then a Portuguese colony, started arriving in sizable numbers. They came to fill the needs of the labour market, which had been partly depleted by emigration. After decolonization in 1974, inflows of Africans from the former colonies continued. Cape Verde was always predominant, followed by Angola and Guinea-Bissau. In the early 1990s, immigration from Brazil
started to increase, so that today, after successive waves, Brazilians are the main foreign nationality in Portugal. Data on the foreign population illustrate these trends. As Figure 10.2 shows, foreigners from Portuguese-speaking countries have consistently accounted for the bulk of all foreign residents in Portugal.

In the late 1990s, Eastern European immigration began as well, bringing in Ukrainians, Romanians, Moldavians, and others. Asian immigration, from China, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and other countries, was steady but grew more significantly in the new century. The same period saw a steady inflow from Western Europe, mainly the United Kingdom (for a synthesis, see Pires 2010).

Three characteristics of immigration to Portugal are worth emphasizing, given their importance for the country’s integrationary approach. First, most of the flows have a postcolonial character. Among the main foreign nationalities, the proportion of former colonies is impressive: Brazil, Cape Verde, and other Portuguese-speaking countries were always a large majority. Foreign immigration has a clear continuity with the country’s past, and in many cases, current and counter-currents are evident. The Portuguese-speaking countries are united by a migration system (Baganha 2009; Cois and Marcques 2009) and share a history, culture, and language. Despite the many hurdles to successful integration that still exist, this is crucial for explaining the development of Portuguese immigration policy.

Second, economic drivers predominate. Except for the large migration stream from Africa in the mid-1970s, which gathered more ethnic Europeans than ethnic Africans and had an obvious political drive, most newcomers to Portugal migrated for economic reasons. The evolution over the years reveals a close relationship between immigration and economic cycles: it increases in times of prosperity and decreases in times of hardship (Peixoto 2002). Immigrants’ labour participation rates have always been high (OECD 2008; Oliveira and Gomes 2019); men and women are both strongly engaged in the market and are viewed by the population as hard workers and not welfare leeches.

Third, the cultural and religious diversity among newcomers to Portugal is low. Immediately after Brazil and the African Portuguese-speaking countries, the largest group of immigrants comes from Eastern Europe. This inflow has no previous links to Portugal, but its integration has proved not to be hard. Besides being European, most of them have quickly learned the language and entered the labour market as wage earners, further enhancing their living conditions. Asian immigrants have increased in number and live in relatively closed communities, but rank as the majority with the highest entrepreneurial rates, operating businesses used by the entire population (Oliveira 2016). Regarding religion, the number of Muslims is rather limited, and most have a Portuguese background or come from former colonies, particularly Guinea-Bissau. The relationship between the Muslim community and mainstream religious groups has been quite smooth.

In brief, the long coexistence of emigration and immigration and the characteristics of immigration help explain the evolution of immigration policies in Portugal. In contrast to other immigrant-receiving countries (see, for example, the previous three chapters of this volume), some particularities emerge: most immigrants share a language and history with the host society; economically motivated flows largely exceed refugee flows and cultural and religious backlashes are rare. Unlike other Southern European host countries, Portugal is not a popular destination for land or maritime irregular flows. Given the economic hardships of the country and the recurrent emigration waves, it is not hard for native-born citizens to understand immigrants.

The Development and Achievements of Immigrant Integration Policies over Time

Portugal’s experience with migration and integration, rather than immigration and integration, helps explain the policy options toward immigrants’ integration. However, it would be incomplete to end our explanation there. As a wide literature has demonstrated (e.g., Zincone 2006), the making of immigration policies is complex, with dynamic strategies developed by several stakeholders leading to unique and often unexpected results. Similar contexts can lead to contrasting policies, as demonstrated by a comparison with other Southern European countries.

Regarding the general legal framework, the first immigration law in Portugal was tabled in 1981, aimed at tackling the first foreign inflows and anticipating the accession to the EU (which happened in 1986). The inherent difficulty of controlling inflows was already evident with this law and continued afterwards, since irregular migration never ceased. The second law dates from 1993, this time anticipating membership in the Schengen Agreement (implemented in 1995). This law was more restrictive; even so, the high number of irregular immigrants at the time led to the country’s first extraordinary regularization, in 1992–93.

The 1990s witnessed an increasingly progressive approach toward immigration. In 1996, a second regularization process was launched. As with the former, most applicants came from Portuguese-speaking countries. A less restrictive approach was evident in a new law, introduced in 1998, and was reinforced with a subsequent law in 2001. The latter accepted the principle of granting temporary residence rights (autorizações de permanência) to irregular immigrants who had overstayed but had a labour contract and were paying social security. Family reunions were treated as a right in both laws. The granting of temporary rights corresponded, in practice, to regularization—the most sweeping the country has known to this day (184,000 immigrants). This time, Eastern Europeans joined Portuguese-speaking immigrants in acquiring legal status.
A less progressive law was adopted in 2003, but it did not block two additional regularization processes in 2003 and 2004. In 2007, a more progressive immigration law was approved that is still in effect today (although there have been some revisions and updates over the years). This law simplified procedures and bureaucracy in order to stimulate legal migration; embraced a principle of relative openness, given economic or human rights considerations; and reaffirmed the fight against illegal migration. A notable point was the introduction of a mechanism of "ordinary" regularization, based on the principle of de facto integration, such as labour insertion and having children at local schools (Pezoto and Sabino 2009).

In terms of the IESPI framework, the most important changes occurred in the realm of integration policy. During the 1980s, policies targeting immigrants centered mainly on the regulation of flows, since the earlier 1990s, policies have also started to cover mechanisms of integration. The first measure that can be named as such was launched by the Ministry of Education in 1991: the creation of an agency devoted to developing multicultural education programs.

After the mid-1990s, a series of ambitious and coherent policies were launched, and they have remained in place to this day. In 1996, the government created the position of High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME) with the objective of promoting immigrants' integration. This was based on five principles:

first, the positive impact of immigrants on Portuguese society was acknowledged; second, integration was underlined as an inter-ministerial intervention, in other words as a holistic action; third, the promotion of immigrants' integration underlined the consultation and dialogue with entities that represent immigrant communities; fourth, integration meant achieving better life conditions in Portugal with respect to immigrants' identity and culture of origin; and finally, integration of immigrants also implied equal opportunities and combating racial discrimination. (Oliveira 2012: 295)

In 2003, with the upsurge of immigration to the country (particularly of non-Portuguese speakers), this policy gathered strength when the High Commissioner's cabinet was converted into a High Commission. In 2007 the agency's resources were further reinforced and the designation changed: it was renamed the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI). The intent here was to reinforce cultural dialogue and the involvement of all stakeholders. Finally, in 2014, the name was again changed, this time to High Commission for Migration (ACM). The objective was to combine integration, immigration, asylum, and emigration policies under the same administrative umbrella.

Throughout its existence under left- and right-wing governments, the High Commission has taken a sound approach to immigration issues. To start, it adopted a comprehensive approach. Instead of observing the implications of immigration for home affairs, social security, and labour separately, the agency involved all governmental sectors simultaneously. The principle was that immigration was a complex and multidimensional reality that could only be addressed by a holistic approach (i.e., by "joined-up government") (Oliveira 2012). The High Commission has always reported directly to the Minister of the Presidency and involved representatives from many ministries.

The agency has enacted several policy measures. Since 2004, there has been direct provision of services to immigrants through specialized support centres — the "one-stop-shop approach" (Oliveira, Abranches, and Healy 2009). National and Local Immigrant Support Centres exist in the main cities and municipalities, joining various public services in the same location. The establishment of protocols with civil society organizations (e.g., immigrant associations) has guaranteed the presence of intercultural mediators (many of them immigrants themselves). Notably, these centres provide services to all immigrants, regardless of their legal status. Despite the presence of the Aliens and Borders Service (SEF) — the police for foreigners — on the premises, it is not uncommon for irregular immigrants to visit. This approach to irregular immigration has a longer history. For example, since 2001 access to health care has been granted to both legal and irregular immigrants, and since 2004 all children, regardless of the legal situation of their parents, have the same access to schools. The overarching goal has been to improve immigrants' living conditions, regardless of their legal status.

Some instruments add further coherence to Portugal's integration policies. Since 1998, a Consultative Council for Immigration Affairs (later called Council for Migration) has been in place, joining representatives from different ministries, immigrant associations, other civil society organizations, employers, and trade unions. Also since 2002, an Observatory for Migration has monitored the immigration situation, recruiting academics and researchers to evaluate policy impacts and thus encouraging the development of informed policy. Since 2014 this Observatory has been responsible for publishing annual statistical reports with indicators of immigrant integration (Oliveira and Gomes 2019), in partnership with the National Statistical Institute (INE).

To encourage further coherence, in 2007 and 2010 two Action Plans for Immigrant Integration were launched. They contained a series of specific integration measures (including for welfare), involving several ministries, with the aim of achieving consistency among different areas of intervention (Oliveira 2012). The design of both plans counted on the support of other stakeholders, particularly immigrant associations. In 2015, Portugal launched the Strategic Plan for Migrations 2015–2020, aiming to coordinate both emigration and immigration political guidelines and interventions within the same action plan. In 2019, Portugal launched a National Plan to implement the Global Pact on
Migration, becoming the first country in the world to convert the pact into a national action plan, with political commitments on migration to be implemented by different public institutions.

Over the years, Portugal has approached immigrant integration in very broad terms. The intervention areas have included education, labour, health, housing, welfare, immigrants' participation, religion, anti-discrimination measures, awareness-raising in relation to immigration and cultural diversity, and holistic integration services and measures (for a detailed description, see Oliveira 2012). Most of these measures have directly targeted immigrants and their descendants; others had addressed the mass media and the entire population with a view to framing attitudes toward immigration.

Other areas have been crucial to developing the Portuguese inclusive model. Some pertain to the general legal framework described earlier. Despite the endemic difficulty of controlling migration, opening the possibility that legal status will be granted on certain grounds has been a way of integrating foreigners. Others involve the nationality law: a series of changes, which culminated in the 2006 law, have given way to a relatively liberal stance toward the acquisition of nationality. This liberal approach has been observed ever since (Oliveira, Gomes, and Santos 2017). For example, in 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, a change in the law implied that children born in Portugal of foreign parents would be able to acquire Portuguese citizenship provided that they resided legally in the country for more than one year.

The High Commission has been in place for many years, working with governments of different political orientations, which have accepted the same broad integration principles. Moreover, the immigration and nationality laws have often been approved with a broad political consensus. This has not been achieved without negotiations, compromises, and individual leadership.

**Immigrants’ Inclusion Outcomes: Achievements and Challenges**

In most European countries, some of the most persistent critiques of immigration relate to levels of immigrant welfare dependence and fears of “welfare migration” (Koning 2017). There is evidence that the combination of generous welfare-state protections and widespread perceptions that immigrants rely more than the native-born on welfare can harden anti-immigration attitudes and thereby increase social policy differentiation between immigrants and the native-born (Burgoon and Rooduijn 2020).

In Portugal, as in many other immigration countries, the risk of poverty or social exclusion is higher among foreigners than among nationals (see Figure 10.3). That risk is much greater for non-EU nationals than for EU nationals (for whom the risk is even lower in some years than for Portuguese citizens). The risk of poverty or social exclusion increased during the years of the recent financial crisis in Portugal, reaching a peak in 2013 with 52% of non-EU national residents at risk, 34% of EU nationals, and 26% of Portuguese citizens.

Foreign residents’ place in the labour market partly explains their higher risk of poverty or social exclusion. Portugal has a segmented labour market (Peixoto 2002). Compared to Portuguese nationals, foreigners (mainly non-EU nationals) are overrepresented in low and unskilled activities (in 2017, 50% of foreign workers versus 39% of national workers), earn lower salaries (foreigners received on average 3% less than nationals in 2017, and 9% less in 2011), and show higher unemployment rates (in 2018 these rates were 12% for foreigners but only 7% for nationals, and in 2013 the gap was as great as 30% versus 16%; see Figure 10.4). Moreover, as analysed in detail by Oliveira and Gomes (2019, 189–90), because immigrants traditionally have lower-income jobs, they tend to receive lower unemployment benefits than the native-born, and for shorter periods of time.

The recent crisis especially affected the economic sectors in which immigrants traditionally are employed (e.g., construction, accommodation, and food service activities), resulting in both a greater increase in unemployment rates among foreign workers and a widening of the gap between foreigners (especially non-EU foreigners) and the country’s overall population. This unemployment growth had direct consequences for the welfare system, because it...
both reduced foreigners’ payments to social security and increased social benefit expenditures.

Regarding other indicators, immigrants also show higher social vulnerability than the native-born. Foreigners describe their own health in more favourable terms than native Portuguese (61% versus 49% in 2019), have fewer work absences due to health problems (20% for foreigners but 26% for native-born Portuguese, in 2019), use fewer social protection subsidies in the event of illness, and face more health risks. Yet they also self-report more unmet needs for medical examination and less use of health services (Oliveira and Gomes 2019, 234–76). Foreign residents are also more likely to reside in overcrowded housing (25% in 2019) than nationals (8%) (Oliveira and Gomes 2019, 224–33).

Because immigrants to Portugal are more vulnerable to challenging economic and social conditions, one might expect them to sometimes be seen as a threat to the welfare state, because they would be expected to rely more on social benefits and to thereby increase social expenditures (Koning 2017). Yet this has never been the case; indeed, the evidence contradicts any suggestion that the overall effect of immigration on the Portuguese welfare state has been negative.

The Portuguese welfare system has always had a very positive financial balance with respect to foreign residents: their payments into social security have consistently been much higher than the social benefits they receive. The aforementioned crisis has somewhat reduced this surplus: foreigners’ payments to the welfare state have decreased and the social benefits they receive have increased. Yet even in these years, the balance in the welfare system between expenditure and revenue was positive. In other words, foreigners have lightened the burden on the Portuguese welfare system even during the most difficult times (Figure 10.5).

In 2019, for every 100 foreign residents there were 67 contributors to the Portuguese welfare system (compared to 45 for the total population) and 19 recipients of social benefits (compared to 26 for the total population) (see also in Oliveira and Gomes 2019, 203). Foreign residents in Portugal have also received lower rates of social benefits per total payments to the welfare system than the native-born. Except between 2010 and 2014, the relative importance of social benefits received by foreigners in total payments by the welfare system has been lower than for the country’s total population: in 2002, social benefits for foreigners represented only 7% of their payments into the system (9 percentage points lower than for the total population), and the gap between foreigners and Portuguese citizens in this respect was even larger in 2005 (when it was as high as 11 percentage points) (detailed in Oliveira and Gomes 2019, 201–2).
All in all, official data indicate that immigrants to Portugal rely much less than the native-born on the welfare state. The same was shown by Burgoon and Rooduijn (2020), who, using aggregated data from seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS; between 2002 and 2014), identified Portugal as one of only three countries (along with Italy and Hungary) where migrants are less likely to depend on social benefits than the native-born.

The impacts of the financial crisis in Portugal could have led to welfare retreatment after 2011; however, the policy responses for alleviating welfare pressure and dependence took another approach: amending some social policies (e.g., reducing assigned values of social benefits, differentiating access to social benefits according to time of payments to social security, increasing the payments to health care, and reducing exceptions); and expanding immigrant-targeted labour market policies (e.g., entrepreneurship support programs, training programs, language courses, tax incentives to foreign investors). The reduction of social benefits per total payments to social security after 2014 alleviated the welfare pressure, and this allowed Portugal to return to some of the rules and frameworks prior to the Troika intervention, although it continued to face the most negative effects of austerity, specifically regarding access to education and health care (González and Figueiredo 2014, 333).

So if Burgoon and Rooduijn (2020) are correct that “where migrants rely disproportionately more on social benefits, anti-immigration attitudes can more readily awaken opposition to welfare redistribution,” we would expect the opposite to occur in Portugal, where immigrants are not a burden on the welfare system and where crises affect all equally in terms of social protection.

Immigration Endorsement in Portugal

Immigration is becoming an increasingly politicized and divisive issue in many host societies (Koning 2019). Growing segments of the electorate and the political elite are showing hostility toward immigrants. In Portugal, although tensions between immigration and welfare sustainability are continuously being monitored (Oliveira and Gomes 2019), and immigration is an increasingly debated topic, a remarkable convergence has taken place since the 1990s among the dominant political parties (Peixoto and Sabino 2009; Oliveira and Carvalhais 2017). This is in stark contrast to the polarization on this issue in other countries (see the other chapters in this volume, in particular chapter 9 on the United States).

The most revealing examples of Portuguese convergence were the votes taken on the citizenship regime (in 2006), and the Immigration Act (since 2007), which saw broad political consensus among the right- and left-wing parties in parliament (Oliveira and Carvalhais 2017). Furthermore, extraordinary regularization programs and expanded integration policies between 1992 and 2004 were carried out under governments of both political orientations, and the current regime of ordinary regularization has been accepted by governments of all political stripes. Action plans for immigrants’ integration have been developed and implemented since 2007 by both ends of the political spectrum. All politicians seem to agree on the importance of successfully integrating immigrants and their descendants, and tend to see immigration issues as non-divisive (Oliveira and Carvalhais 2017).

Policy-makers have frequently based their arguments on evidence supporting the positive impacts of inflows. Although it is clear that immigration will not on its own resolve the country’s challenges of an aging population and consequent welfare sustainability (Peixoto et al. 2017, 259–60), this argument has often been used in public debate. Many policy-makers have recognized the potential contributions of immigrants to the birth rate, the labour market, and the welfare system. These ideas have been used to promote inclusive policies, including investment in integration. As could be read in the introduction to the National Action Plan for Migrations 2015–2020, written under a centre-right government that was lifting the country out of an economic crisis:

In recent years the net migration in Portugal no longer compensates the negative birth rates. Thus, Portugal is in a situation of demographic fragility. It is in this context that the migratory phenomenon in Portugal must be analysed and a transversal policy drawn up to account for the evolution of this system. Portugal’s immigration policy must reflect the changes that occurred in the migratory profiles. Studies show the positive effect of immigration on public finances and how immigrants are net contributors.

The situation may have changed recently. The extreme right has begun promoting racist attitudes and xenophobia, but this did not bring them any significant electoral gains until 2019. That year, a new party entered the Portuguese parliament that injected stronger anti-immigrant rhetoric into public debate. Paradoxically, this right-wing party entered parliament at the same time that left-wing parties increased the representation of African descendants in parliament. Such results seem to reflect voters’ lack of enthusiasm for xenophobic and anti-immigration agendas. Unlike in other European countries, the extreme-right and nationalistic agendas in Portugal have had no influence on policy-making, and such parties have not been part of any coalition government (Oliveira and Carvalhais 2017).

Findings from the ESS confirm this: Table 10.1 compares the attitudes of surveyed people in Portugal according to their political self-placement on a left/right scale. We focus on their attitudes toward migration from poorer countries outside Europe and their perceptions as to whether immigrants are bad or good for the country’s economy. Regardless of the political self-identification of respondents in Portugal, the majority believe that the country should allow in some immigrants from poorer non-European countries and that immigration
is good for the economy. More than half of the respondents, whatever their political self-identification, agree that Portugal should allow some immigration from poorer countries; however, those who identify as right-wing (53.9%) or centre-right (57.1%) are somewhat less likely to say so than self-identified left (64%) and centre-left (63.6%) respondents. Slight differences are also identified regarding the perception that immigrants are good for the Portuguese economy; such sentiment is more pervasive among left and centre-left respondents (76.1% and 63.2%) than among those who identify as centre-right (57.3%) and right (62.1%). Similar results were identified on the question of when immigrants should obtain rights to social benefits or services. Around half the respondents of each political self-placement agree that immigrants should obtain such social rights after having worked and paid taxes for at least one year, and here, the differences in response patterns are relatively small. For example, those who self-identify as left, centre-left, and centrist are slightly more likely to say that immigrants should obtain social rights immediately after arrival than those who identify as centre-right and right.

Despite this consensus around immigration and integration policies, the differences among political parties on the granting of social rights to immigrants should not be overlooked. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the successive changes in the structure of the welfare system have followed the governing parties’ overall programs, toward slightly fewer restrictions during centre-left governments and slightly more restrictions during centre-right governments (Peixoto and Sabino 2009, 191).

Nonetheless, many restrictions that have taken place can be understood more as a consequence of the impacts of the economic and financial crisis (which increased unemployment and the number of social beneficiaries) and demographic aging on the sustainability of the welfare system than as evidence of a tension between immigration and welfare. This is confirmed in the results of the EU’s annual standard Eurobarometer: immigration has been shown repeatedly in recent years to be a minor national concern for Portuguese respondents (in the spring of 2019, only 4% viewed immigration as a challenge to the country – fully 13 percentage points lower than the EU average).

In longitudinal surveys, Portuguese respondents express increasingly positive views about the impacts of immigration on Portugal, although a potential conflict arising from perceived competition in the labour market may be latent (Peixoto and Sabino 2009; Oliveira and Gomes 2019). In the ESS, Portuguese respondents have become slightly more positive about the effect of migration over the years: between 2002 and 2018 (and especially in the years of the economic and financial crisis), the percentage who considered that the country had become a better place to live since the arrival of foreigners and who perceived the economy as having improved as a result of immigration increased considerably. Among the factors identified to explain the variances in Portuguese public opinion about immigration over time are age (younger adults more favourable), intensity of contacts with residents of different backgrounds (regular contacts increase sympathy), political positioning (left or centre more favourable), education level, and socio-professional status and income (the higher the above-mentioned factors, the more favourable the attitude) (Peixoto and Sabino 2009, 194).

The ESS also examined attitudes toward redistribution and equal treatment. Data from the ESS 2018 indicate that attitudes in Portugal are highly egalitarian:

### Table 10.1. Public attitudes on immigration, according to political self-placement on left-right scale, 2016 and 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Centre-left</th>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Centre-right</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Total (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe to come and live in Portugal (Round 9, 2018)</td>
<td>(19.9)</td>
<td>(18.7)</td>
<td>(15.2)</td>
<td>(17.6)</td>
<td>(12.2)</td>
<td>(16.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow some</td>
<td>(84.0)</td>
<td>(65.6)</td>
<td>(66.6)</td>
<td>(57.1)</td>
<td>(53.9)</td>
<td>(62.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow few</td>
<td>(14.0)</td>
<td>(15.8)</td>
<td>(14.3)</td>
<td>(19.0)</td>
<td>(24.3)</td>
<td>(16.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow none</td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td>(1.9)</td>
<td>(4.0)</td>
<td>(6.8)</td>
<td>(9.6)</td>
<td>(4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>(136)</td>
<td>(209)</td>
<td>(329)</td>
<td>(147)</td>
<td>(115)</td>
<td>(1029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants bad or good for Portugal’s economy* (Round 9, 2018)</td>
<td>(12.9)</td>
<td>(12.3)</td>
<td>(13.5)</td>
<td>(24.0)</td>
<td>(18.1)</td>
<td>(15.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not bad nor good</td>
<td>(13.0)</td>
<td>(24.5)</td>
<td>(23.0)</td>
<td>(18.7)</td>
<td>(19.8)</td>
<td>(20.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good for the economy</td>
<td>(78.1)</td>
<td>(63.2)</td>
<td>(61.9)</td>
<td>(57.3)</td>
<td>(62.1)</td>
<td>(64.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>(138)</td>
<td>(212)</td>
<td>(339)</td>
<td>(150)</td>
<td>(116)</td>
<td>(1056)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Political placement is in a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right), being the variable recorded to this analysis in the scale: left (0, 1, 2), centre-left (3, 4), centre (5), centre-right (6, 7) and right (8, 9, 10). ** The variable is a scale from 0 (bad) to 10 (good), being recorded to this analysis as “bad for the economy” (0 to 4), “neither bad nor good” (5) and “good for the economy” (6 to 10). *** The total includes residuals and no answer to political self-placement.

Source: ESS Rounds 8 and 9.
the majority of respondents agree or agree strongly that a society is fair "when it takes care of those who are poor and in need, regardless of what they give back" (62.4% and 21.4%, respectively) and "when income and wealth is equally distributed" (51.4% and 26.1%, respectively), and consider it to be "important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities" (33.3%) stated that people who have that opinion are "very much like me" and 33.8% stated they are "like me". Small variations are observed when we cross-tabulate attitudes toward redistribution and equal treatment with attitudes toward immigration from poorer countries. Generally, respondents mainly agree or agree strongly with redistribution and equal treatment (even among the minority of respondents who believe that Portugal should allow just few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe). Hence, although generally the Portuguese case confirms that individuals with pro-immigration attitudes are more likely to support redistribution and equality in society (similar to the findings of Burgone and Rooduijn 2020), it is also relevant that even individuals with anti-immigration attitudes are largely supportive of redistribution and equality in society. In other words, in Portugal anti-immigration sentiments do not undermine support for welfare redistribution or equal treatment.

To understand the support for welfare redistribution and equal treatment even among those who show anti-immigration sentiments, one should again consider the particular characteristics of Portugal's migration experience discussed earlier (a comparatively small foreign population, which largely consists of individuals who are culturally aligned and do not depend on social benefits). Moreover, Portugal's social welfare spending is limited, so welfare redistribution and equal treatment do not mean greater generosity of the national welfare system toward immigrants relative to native-born. Thus, as Burgone and Rooduijn (2020, 22) also concluded, it may be that welfare distribution and equal treatment are undermined by anti-immigration sentiments only "when and where ex ante foreign-born stocks, actual social-welfare spending, and migrant dependency on social benefits (relative to native) are all high. Yet such anti-immigration sentiments can actually undergird support for redistribution (compensation effect) where foreign-born stocks, social spending and migrant welfare dependency are low."

Conclusions

The inclusionary trend in Portugal in recent decades is such that it has gone from being one of the second most exclusionary country in 1990 to the second most inclusionary one in 2010 and 2015 in the IESPI dataset. This is quite remarkable.

This change suggests that welfare politics and responses to immigrant welfare dependence are not straightforward; rather, they are shaped by several determinants that may vary over time and across social contexts. The Portuguese case highlights several such determinants: (1) migratory experience (including not only inflows, but also outflows and diaspora claims, which foster a pro-migrant narrative) and immigrant population characteristics (e.g., labour participation, cultural proximity to the native-born, low social benefit dependency); (2) contextual legacies (in particular the colonial past and the relatively recent democratization), which have framed the definition of the welfare system; (3) legal framework (e.g., constitutional principles, EU guidelines); (4) characteristics of the welfare system (e.g., degree of generosity of welfare state protections, welfare sustainability); (5) country characteristics that make it more or less dependent on immigrants (e.g., demographic structure, labour market, economy, and the effect of crisis); and (6) the general endorsement of immigration (lack of divisive political actors and relatively favourable public opinion).

Nonetheless, these explanatory factors arising from the Portuguese case provide no definitive conclusion on how welfare politics become more inclusionary to immigrants over time. We cannot rule out that similar legacies or migratory experiences will lead to the opposite response (i.e., exclusionary welfare) elsewhere. It would be naive to establish a causal link between context and policies, as similar contexts can lead to contrasting policies (this seems to be confirmed by the mostly inconclusive results in chapter 3, which suggest that explanations for welfare inclusion and exclusion do not apply uniformly to all countries).

The fact is that Portugal has chosen an inclusionary path, both in welfare policies and in integration policies for immigrants, especially since the beginning of this century, with immigration increasing as much as the percentage of the foreign residents in the total population. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that even after two decades of inclusion, Portugal may only take an exclusionary turn. The changes in the Portuguese political arena, in particular the arrival in 2019 of a right-wing party in parliament and growing racist and anti-immigration rhetoric in public debate, may create uncertainty about the inclusionary approach, threatening pro-immigration public opinion and the political consensus on immigration and integration.

Over the course of this inclusionary path of almost two decades, Portugal has maintained relatively favourable public opinion and a consensual approach to immigration issues among mainstream political parties. By and large, immigration is acknowledged as a necessity for the country's welfare, demography, and economy. Accessible social and integration policies are thus perceived as investments, and the positive outlook on immigration is maintained even in unfavourable economic and financial moments such as the one observed in Portugal more recently.

The impact of immigrants' cultural and historical affinities on the host country (a consequence of past colonial experience and return migration) should also not be overlooked. Other socio-economic characteristics of the immigrant
population in Portugal, including the predominant economic motivation, higher labour market participation, and lower social benefit dependency, should also be considered to explain the Portuguese politics of welfare for immigrants. Welfare conditions and their legacies also play a role. The Portuguese welfare state is relatively young (around 40 years), and its inclusionary approach is rooted in the 1976 Constitution. Since then, welfare redistribution and equal treatment to all residents (including non-citizens) have been advocated as a touchstone of democracy. This does not mean, however, that the original principles (e.g., equality and non-discrimination) have not been challenged over the years. Those principles have encountered contradictions and vicissitudes, in particular related to demography, public finances, and the economy as a whole. Additionally, the Portuguese inclusionary welfare principles of equality and non-discrimination in social benefits redistribution should not be mistaken as welfare generosity and high social expenditure. Immigrants, as much as the native-born, are affected by Portugal being among the European countries with the lowest social protection expenditures as a percentage of GDP.

While Portugal stands out for its integration policies for immigrants and inclusionary welfare system, that does not mean immigrants are at lower risk of poverty or have the same social and economic conditions as the native-born. Inequalities persist (e.g., immigrants are more likely to be poor, to be unemployed, to earn low income, to work in risky and dirty jobs, to live in worse housing, and to have less accessibility to public health services than the native-born), and those inequalities have been exacerbated in years of economic crisis.

The Portuguese welfare system aimed to grant public support to all citizens in an era marked by global and national economic difficulties. The national public debt and financial tensions had direct consequences for the effectiveness of social protection for all residents. Today, Portuguese income levels and living standards are still below average for the EU, and levels of poverty and social exclusion are higher. The welfare state is incapable of closing these gaps. If this applies to the whole population, it also applies to immigrants. Although the Portuguese welfare system is fairly inclusionary (as the IESP1 underscores), and by constitutional principle is universal to all residents (including foreign residents), that does not mean that in practice it can address all the needs of the native-born and immigrants.

NOTES

1. When compared to other member states of the European Union (EU28), Portugal tends to be below the average on social protection expenditure (in percentage of GDP). In 2018, its general government expenditure on social protection represented 17.1% of GDP, compared to an EU28 average of 18.6%.

2. See Appendix 10.1 for a chronology of selected social support policies since 1976, with contextual factors.

3. The only exceptions regard political rights.

4. For an overview see Mendes (2011) and Peixoto (2011).

5. This has since been renamed "social insertion income" as a consequence of successive changes starting in 2003.

6. Portugal stands out as one of the most aged countries in Europe, having a negative natural balance since 2007. A recent study by the European Commission (2018) highlighted the impacts of population aging on the evolution of the labour force, pensions, the health system, and welfare, finding that there are serious challenges to the sustainability of European social protection systems.

7. "Troika" was the decision group formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund as the consequence of Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal entering risk of insolvency after the world financial crisis of 2008. The financial bailout and associated austerity measures were in force in Portugal between 2011 and 2014.

8. However, these figures must be read cautiously, since they do not count immigrants who have acquired Portuguese citizenship. Over the years, a large proportion of foreigners have become Portuguese (more than half a million since 2006; see Oliveira and Gomes 2013, 277–300).

9. In the 28 EU member states, Portugal is still among the countries with the lowest percentage of foreigners as residents (it is in twentieth position among the EU28). One might hypothesize, therefore, that the relatively small size of the foreign population explains the host society's attitudes toward immigration and support for an inclusionary welfare state.

10. The regularization was justified by this contradiction: immigrants in an irregular situation were residing in the country and paying social security, believing that they would have rights, but they did not due to the absence of legal status as residents; thus, the Portuguese state was earning from these contributions without providing social rights.

11. The tradition of Portugal as an emigration country has also been used in the past. In 2004, Portugal launched a campaign to raise awareness of the positive contributions made by immigrants. The campaign had the motto "We have been for many centuries a country of emigrants. Now it is our turn to welcome, as only we know how, all those immigrants who work together with us to construct a better Portugal." This was associated with images of immigrants to whom was written "Thank you."

12. Data from Eurobarometer 91.

13. Burren and Voodoijis (2020, 15) concluded that "respondents harbouring anti-immigration sentiments tend to be less likely to support redistribution than those with more pro-immigration attitudes," though the effect they found was quite modest.
### Appendix Table 10.1. Chronology of selected social support policies, since 1976, with contextual factors (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy developments</th>
<th>Main content</th>
<th>Contextual factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Equality principle: foreigners and stateless persons residing in Portugal enjoy the same rights and are subject to the same duties as Portuguese citizens.</td>
<td>End of dictatorial regime in 1974, which induced several revolutionary social dynamics, aspiring for more economic, political, and social equality. Centre-left government from 1976 till 1978.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>First legal act that defined the organic structure of welfare system</td>
<td>Three fundamental principles: integration, decentralization, and participation. Transition to a unified model of social protection. Underlined the universality of the system, universal guarantee of access to health and social security benefits to all residents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Ministerial order to create the national health system</td>
<td>Conceived as a free service, although with the possibility of introducing health fees as means of rationalizing demand. Health fees seen as an instrument to encourage users to share national health system costs and avoid unnecessary demand on services.</td>
<td>From 1978 to 1980 several independent governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>First Social Security Act</td>
<td>Established a budget for the general social security regime funded by the contributions of both employers and employees and the state budget financing of the non-contributory system. General regime based on both duration (period worked) and amount (workers' contributions and wages).</td>
<td>Socialist government (centre-left) from 1983 till 1985.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Creation of the unemployment insurance system</td>
<td>From 1985 till 1995 centre-right government.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>First basic law on education</td>
<td>Generalized and universal access to education. Portugal entrance to EU in 1986.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
Appendix Table 10.1. Chronology of selected social support policies, since 1976, with contextual factors (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy developments</th>
<th>Main content</th>
<th>Contextual factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Creation of the minimum guaranteed income</td>
<td>Ambitious social measure involving both a monetary allowance and a social integration program. All residents benefit from the measure (including immigrants residing legally in the country).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Creation of the cabinet of the High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities</td>
<td>Immigrants' integration in focus as an inter-ministerial intervention.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Creation of the Consultative Council for Immigration Affairs</td>
<td>Council presided by the High Commissioner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>New Immigration Act</td>
<td>Still focused on border control.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Revisions to welfare entitlements to foreign residents to encourage their formal labour market integration</td>
<td>Access to unemployment insurance and to labour market program support is extended to foreigners who had worked and paid social security for a minimum period of time in the country.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Second Framework Law on Social Security (centre-left government)</td>
<td>Introduction of efficiency and effectiveness goals, combined with reinforcement of the system's equity (social protection citizenship, contributory social protection and complementary protection modalities). Access to unemployment insurance and to labour market program support was extended to foreigners who had worked and paid social security for a minimum period of time in the country (presently a minimum of six months is required).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>All foreigners with legal and illegal residence (in the country for more than 90 days) have the right to health care.</td>
<td>From 2002 till 2005 centre-right government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>Third revision of social security law.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>High Commissioner's cabinet converted into High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities. Reports directly to the Minister of the Presidency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum guaranteed income revised into &quot;social insertion income&quot;. Restrictions introduced to foreigners. Constitutional Court considers restrictions on immigrants' access unconstitutional (revoked in 2005).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Regularization processes to immigrants</td>
<td>Temporary residence rights to irregular immigrants that overstayed with a labour contract and were paying for the Portuguese welfare system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>Access to education to all children regardless of legal residence</td>
<td>All children, regardless of the legal situation of their parents, have the same access to mandatory school levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Social Security Act</td>
<td>Focus on the sustainability of the system according to the country's aging demographic, adjusting the old-age pension system to the life expectancy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Policy developments</td>
<td>Main content</td>
<td>Contextual factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Renamed and reinforced: High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue</td>
<td>Reinforcement of the public institution for immigrants' integration. Reinforce several services and programs for immigrants (e.g., national and local centres for immigrants integration since 2004 with a branch of Social Security in the one-stop-shops).</td>
<td>Since 2007 Portugal with negative natural balance and positive net migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Portugal launches the first integration action plan for immigrants</td>
<td>Implemented between 2007 and 2009, involving several ministries. Specific measures of immigrants' integration (including on welfare).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>New Immigration Act</td>
<td>Progressive immigration law: simplified procedures and bureaucracy. Explicit references to the rights and duties (including social protection) of legal residents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Austerity measures: changes in the social protection regime</td>
<td>Reduced the number of beneficiaries of social benefits and the amounts conceded: increase of selectivity and eligibility criteria. Also defined a differentiated treatment on the extension of social benefits according to the nationality of the beneficiary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix Table 10.1. Chronology of selected social support policies, since 1976, with contextual factors (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy developments</th>
<th>Main content</th>
<th>Contextual factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Revisions to Social Security Act</td>
<td>Constitutional court deliberated unconstitutional applicability to foreigners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>High Commission for Migration</td>
<td>Public institution for migrants integration revised; join immigration, asylum and emigration policies in the same administrative body.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Strategic plan for migrations</td>
<td>Coordinate in the same plan measures for both immigrants, refugees and Portuguese emigrants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Revisions to austerity measures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Since the end of 2015 centre-left government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>New social protection framework</td>
<td>New framework to beneficiaries of social protection in case of illness, unemployment, or parenthood.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>National plan to implement the Global Pact on Migration</td>
<td>Portugal is the first country in the world to convert the UN pact into a national action plan with political commitments.</td>
<td>In 2017 Portugal return to positive net migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>New legal framework for foreign contributors to the welfare system</td>
<td>Law approved in parliament that underscores that one year of payments to the welfare system gives the right to foreigners to obtain a residence permit, even if they did not enter the country legally.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>